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Abstract
We show that monetary trading is simple, self-enforcing, symmet-
ric, and irreducible in a natural framework. Furthermore, we will show
that the utility for each economic agent is at least as big under the
monetary system as under any other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric,
and irreducible trading system of the same complexity. Thus, we ra-
tionalize the monetary nature of real-world trade as being an efficient
way to achieve those properties.
“The search for a means of exchange is almost as old as
mankind.” — The Economist, December 22nd 2001, page 87.
1 Introduction
Throughout time the means of exchange have changed considerably. Many
commodities have been used as media of exchange, including chocolate, shells,
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butter, salt, and, of course, paper. Recently, technological developments led
to a substantial increase of cash substitutes like electronic payments and
credit cards in most developed countries.1 Despite all the technological devel-
opments in payment systems, the nature of exchange in developed economies
is strikingly similar to what is has been before — each person has a balance,
which rises when he gives up goods, and falls when he acquires goods. The
trading system is, in an informational sense, still a monetary one: all that has
changed is that the balance, which was once physical, has become virtual.
This persistence of monetary exchange is puzzling. Given the advances in
record-keeping and communication technology, it now seems feasible to de-
sign a trading system which conditions trading behavior in information that
monetary exchange ignores. By taking into account that information, such
a trading system has the potential to be more efficient than a monetary one.
In fact, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) explicitly design a non-monetary
trading system, which is more efficient than a monetary system whenever the
record-keeping technology is sufficiently developed. Why do not real-world
trading systems exploit these efficiency gains? Why do we observe monetary
trading and not some other trading arrangement?
In this essay, we provide an answer to these questions. Several authors
have pointed out that many real life institutions are self-enforcing, treat
individuals symmetrically, cannot be simplified, and their rules are simple to
understand. Furthermore, they argue that those properties seem necessary
for any social institution to endure. Following their work, we will construct in
a natural framework a monetary trading system that is simple, self-enforcing,
symmetric, and irreducible. Furthermore, we will show that the utility for
each economic agent is at least as big under the monetary system as under any
other simple, self-enforcing, symmetric, and irreducible trading system of the
same complexity. In other words, any trading system having the properties
necessary to endure can be (weakly) dominated by a monetary trading system
of the same level of complexity. In this sense, monetary trading is an optimal
social institution, thus rationalizing the monetary nature of real-world trade.
We will describe our model by listing its time and uncertainty structure,
its agents, the actions available to them, and their preferences over different
action combinations; hence, we consider a noncooperative stochastic game
1Humphrey and Vesala (1996) found that “in all (fourteen) developed countries but
the United States, electronic payments have been either the sole or the primary reason for
the thirty four percent rise in total non-cash payments between 1987 and 1993.”
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(Sobel (1971)) as a natural model of the type of society we are interested
in. As is stressed by Wallace (1997), and is standard in monetary economics
models, we will consider a society in which trade between its members is
difficult. The nature of this difficulty is what is called absence of double
coincidence of wants and consists of the following: when any pair of its
members meet, it will never be the case that both have the goods the other
would like to consume.2
Following the work of Aumann (1981), and Selten (1975), we will focus
on strategies that can be played by finite automata,3 and that are subgame
perfect. The reason we impose such restrictions is that those equilibria can
be naturally classified as simple, and self-enforcing, respectively. We will
also focus on automata that are symmetric in a similar way as in Okuno-
Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), and are irreducible in the sense that any
state of the automaton can be reached from any other state. Note that a
reducible automaton can be simplified by reducing one state in a way that
it produces the same outcome. Thus, only irreducible automata may be
impossible to simplify.4 Finally, following Rubinstein (1986), the complexity
of an automaton is defined to be the size of the state space.
We will formulate the notion of a monetary system as an automaton,
where the state space will represent money holdings, the transition func-
tion will represent how money changes hands according to production and
consumption actions, and the behavior function will represent a monetary
behavior, in the sense that a seller produces for a buyer if and only if the
buyer has enough money.
Our main results are that the monetary automaton is simple, subgame-
perfect, symmetric, and irreducible, and that the utility for each player is
at least as big under the monetary automaton as under any other simple,
subgame-perfect, symmetric, and irreducible automata of the same complex-
2The assumption that it will never be the case that both agents have the goods the
other would like to consume is made only for simplicity. The same results would hold in
a model where sometimes (but not always) the agents could exchange goods for goods.
3An automaton is described by a set of states (one of which is specified to be the initial
state), by a transition function (which gives the next period’s state as a function of the
current period’s state and actions), and by a behavior function (which prescribes behavior
according to the state of the automaton). As Kalai and Stanford (1988) have shown, an
automaton is an equivalent way of describing a strategy, and so throughout this paper the
two terms will be used synonymously.
4Irreducibility is also a necessary condition for semi-perfection, an equilibrium concept
developed by Rubinstein (1986).
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ity. It implies that our monetary system solves an institutional design prob-
lem — it is a Pareto efficient way of obtaining those properties. In this
way we validate a long standing conjecture by Hurwicz (1980), revisited re-
cently by Kocherlakota (1998b) and Wallace (2001), which rationalizes the
monetary nature of real-world trade.
2 Related Literature
Although the focus of the present work is on monetary economics, one can
pose the following broader question: can society design a simple set of rules
in order to achieve certain goals? This question led Okuno-Fujiwara and
Postlewaite (1995) to formalize the intuitive notion of a social norm and to
study what would happen if the interactions between society members were
directed by some social norm.
In particular, they consider a version of the infinitely repeated prisoners’
dilemma with a continuum of players and random matching and they define
in this setting a social norm as a special class of strategies. They then show
that the Folk Theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)) holds even when we
restrict attention to social norms rather than arbitrary strategies. In other
words, given any individually rational payoff, there is a social norm with the
property that it supports that payoff and that the actions it prescribes are
optimal for every player given that the other players are using that social
norm. Later on, Kandori (1992) extended their results to the finite players
case, but the message was the same: the use of social norms may be enough
to sustain any individually rational payoff as a sequential equilibrium payoff
(provided that the discount factor is high enough), even in situations where
the information that each of its members have about the others is limited.
The way those outcomes are supported as an equilibrium is by using a
particular type of norm, in which an observable label is attached to each
person and those labels completely determine players’ behavior. More pre-
cisely, a person that deviates from the equilibrium path is labelled ‘bad,’ and
nobody cooperates with a bad person; hence, nobody will cooperate with a
person that has deviated before. Such a label may not be available in many
circumstances, but as Ellison (1994), and Gata (1995) have shown efficient
outcomes can still be sustained as an equilibrium outcome without the use
of any explicit label.5
5Kandori (1992) also considers the case in which there is not an explicit labelling
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The above results suggest that those social norms could allow for a ef-
ficient level of trade in a trading model in which each player has limited
information about the others. In Carmona (2000), we used a random match-
ing model with finitely many players similar to both the Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989) model, and the framework used by Ellison (1994), and we showed that
indeed monetary trading is Pareto dominated by the Kandori-Ellison norm.
Thus, we ask why the type of norm they studied is not used in most societies,
and why do we observe monetary trading instead.6
A closely related line of research was explored by Townsend (1986). He
considers several environments characterized by spatial separation, private
information and a need to keep track of the past. He then formalizes and
compares different types of communication-accounting systems, concluding
that these systems can be ranked in terms of social welfare, from the worst
to the best, as follows: oral assignment, portable object, written message
and telecommunication systems. However, he compares those different types
of communication-accounting systems assuming that all the agents in the
economy will abide by the rules set by the social planner, except possibly
regarding the revelation of private information; in particular, conditional on
the information agents reveal, it is assumed that all agents will agree to the
allocation chosen by the social planner. In others words, Townsend does
not study how those different types of communication-accounting systems
compare in a situation where the member of the society act strategically and
in a decentralized way.
Our analysis differ also from that of Townsend (1986) in the following
aspects: First, since we define a system to be a strategy, we abstract from
many of its details; in particular, we abstract from any physical object which
may be used in order to achieve the behavior prescribed by the institution.
Second, we compare monetary behavior to all possible behavior, not only to
a finite set of alternatives. Third, we obtain that a monetary system is an
optimal payment arrangement in a given class of strategies, which is not the
case in Townsend (1986) — of course, these discrepancies result from the
different environments, and especially, from the different class of strategies
we consider.
Similarly, Kocherlakota (2002), in an environment with absence of double
technology. In fact, Ellison (1994) uses the same strategy as in section 3 of Kandori
(1992).
6Note that the norm studied by Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) seem to be used in
some societies, namely in the archaic societies studied by Mauss (1990).
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coincidence of wants, presents a “portable-object system” that can implement
frequent trade between society members. Although both his system and a
monetary system are examples of portable objects systems, they are quite
different. Hence, this paper does not address the question of why most
societies use a monetary system.
A monetary system is a possible way to allow for frequent trade be-
tween society members. However, as discussed above, there are other ways of
accomplishing frequent transactions, namely the communication-accounting
systems described by Townsend (1986), the portable object system described
by Kocherlakota (2002) and the social norms studied by Kandori (1992), El-
lison (1994) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
These remarks lead us to Hurwicz (1980)’s conjecture that money might
be an efficient way to solve some institutional design problem, which we
validate by showing that monetary trading is a Pareto efficient way of ob-
taining certain properties typically associated with social institutions. The
importance of this result is that it allow us to regard money not only as an
equilibrium outcome, but also, and more importantly, as an optimal equilib-
rium.
We note, however, that our optimality result for monetary trading is
not the only one available. It is well know that in overlapping generations
models, the monetary equilibrium can be Pareto optimal (see Samuelson
(1958).) Also, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) show that in a random
matching model monetary trading is the optimal trading arrangement when
each person’s actions is private information to the person.
What causes our result to differ from those above is that the properties
that we use to rationalize monetary trading are typically associated with
social institutions. The view we express in this paper, which is substantially
different from the above, is that monetary trading satisfies in optimal way
the properties that any exchange system, as a particular case of a social
institution, need to endure.
Furthermore, as we mentioned in the introduction, our result allow us to
explain why real-world trading systems still have a monetary nature despite
the recent advances in record-keeping and communication technology. This
is in contrast with Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) which explicitly design
a non-monetary trading system that will be more efficient than a monetary
system whenever the record-keeping technology is sufficiently developed.
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3 The Basic Model
There are two people, and they meet in every period t ∈ N. In every period,
a given person can be a producer or a consumer ; we will assume that will be
decided by nature, in a way that each person will be the producer with 1/2
probability.
In our economy consumers and producers are different in the following
way: only the producer has to make a choice, which is whether to produce
(for the consumer) or not. If the producer chooses to produce, he suffer a
utility cost d > 0, and the consumer receives a positive utility u > 0. If the
producer chooses not to produce, them both himself and the consumer will
receive zero utility.
We will assume that production is efficient in the sense that the benefit
derived by the consumer exceeds the cost incurred by the producer. That is,
we will assume that u > d.
Let N = {1, 2} stand for the set of players, Ω = {1, 2} for the set of
states of nature, and A = {P,NP} for the set of possible actions. We make
the convention that when the state of nature equals 1, then player 1 is the
producer, and he will choose an action from the set A; similarly, when the
state of nature equals 2, then player 2 is the producer. The payoff players
receive period-wise, which depend on the state of the nature and on the
choice made by the producer, are summarized in the following table:
ω P NP
1 −d, u 0,0
2 u,−d 0,0
We denote the period-wise payoffs as ui(ω, a).
Intuitively, these state-of-nature-dependent payoffs try to capture a two
person trade meeting, in which there is absence of double coincidence of
wants. We should note that the model is not to be taken literally; in fact, it
is designed to capture the essence of the standard random-matching models
of money (Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)) in a simple way.
In the standard random matching models of money, the essential feature
is that every agent, in every period of time, has a 1
3
probability of meeting
an agent who likes the good he produces but who can not produce the good
he likes (i.e., he has a 1
3
probability of being a seller, in the above sense); has
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a 1
3
probability of meeting an agent who does not like the good he produces
but who can produce the good he likes (i.e., he has a 1
3
probability of being
a buyer, in the above sense); and finally, has a 1
3
probability of meeting
an agent who neither likes the good he produces nor can produce the good
he likes (in our model, there is no situation that corresponds to this one;
however, it could be added without changing the results).
Furthermore, our model belongs to the class of absence of double coinci-
dence models of money. Wallace (1997) defines the general class of absence
of double coincidence models of money in terms of four properties: first, any
such model “contains more than one time period”; second, it “has two-person
meetings”; third, “a specialization pattern among people motivates trade and
is consistent with the lack of double coincidences in two-person meetings”;
and fourth, “something in the model prevents trade from being accomplished
through some prior arrangement or through the use of some form of credit.”
Clearly, our model satisfies the first three properties. Moreover, the assump-
tions of Theorem 1 below will prevent trade from being accomplished through
the use of some form of credit.7
The interaction described above takes place in every period t ∈ N. Each
player’s payoff in the repeated game depends on the payoff he receives in all
periods, in the following way: if ω = {ωk}∞k=1 ⊆ Ω is a sequence of states of
nature and if a = {ak}∞k=1 ⊆ A is a sequence of actions, then player i’s payoff
equals
Ui(ω, a) = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
ui(ωk, ak).
By using the above payoff function, the payoff of any finite automaton,
which will be described in the following section, equals the limit, as the
discount factor goes to one, of the payoffs computed using the discounted
sum criterion. Since in a monetary system players will produce in exchange
for the future benefits of having an extra amount of money, our results would
only hold in the discounted case for a sufficiently high discount factor that
is, in the limit case. Thus, the above payoff function allow us to present our
results in a clearer way, and also, it allows us to simplify some of their proofs.
7This is actually a delicate point. See section 7 for a more detailed discussion.
8
4 Automata, and Monetary Trading
We will describe the behavior of each player by an automaton. An automaton
for player i is a triple Ii = ((Si, s¯i), Ti, Bi) where: Si is a set of states ; s¯i ∈ Si
is the initial state; Ti : Ω × Si × A → Si is a transition function; and
Bi : Si → A is a behavior function.
A pair of individual automata I = (I1, I2), or for short, an automaton,
together with a sequence of states of nature ω = {ωk}∞k=1 ⊆ Ω induce a
sequence of actions a(I,ω) = {ak}∞k=1 ⊆ A in the following way: a1 =
Bω1(s¯ω1), and ak = Bωk(s
k
ωk
), where ski = Ti(s
k−1
i , ak−1), for both i = 1, 2.
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An automaton, together with a sequence of realizations of the uncertainty,
induce a sequence of actions. Since we can compute the payoff generated by a
sequence of realizations of the uncertainty, and actions, we can compute the
payoff of an automaton I as follows: first, for i = 1, 2, we define a function
ω 7→ Ui(I)(ω) by defining
Ui(I)(ω) = Ui(ω, a(I,ω)).
Then, payoff of an automaton I for player i, i = 1, 2, is
Ui(I) =
∫
Ω
Ui(I)(ω)dµ,
where Ω = Ω× Ω× · · · , and µ is the usual product measure.
One of the reason we choose to describe players behavior using automata
is because it allows to describe monetary trading in a very convenient way. Its
definition tries to capture the way people trade in actual monetized societies,
in which one person gives goods and receives money, while some other gives
money and receives goods.
A monetary system IM = (I
M
1 , I
M
2 ) with M ∈ N units of money and
initial money holdings s¯M will be described as follows: the set of states is
SM1 = S
M
2 = SM = {0, ...,M},
and the initial state is s¯M . The transition function T
M
1 = T
M
2 = TM :
8Recall that player i is the producer in period k if ωk = i, i = 1, 2.
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Ω× A× SM → SM is defined by:
TM(1, P,m) =
{
m+ 1 if m ≤M − 1,
m otherwise,
TM(2, P,m) =
{
m− 1 if m ≥ 1,
m otherwise,
TM(ω,NP,m) = m,
The interpretation is as follows: SM represents the set of possible money
holdings for player 1; clearly, we could obtain a similar definition for a
monetary system if the set of status levels were {(m1,m2) ∈ {0, ...,M} ×
{0, ...,M} : m1 +m2 = M}. Regarding TM , the intuition is: when player 1
is the seller, that is, when ω = 1, if he produces he receives one additional
unit of money, unless player 2 does not have any money. When player 1 is
the buyer, that is, when ω = 2, if player 2 produces for him, he has to give
one unit of money to player 2, unless he (player 1) does not have any money.
In the remaining cases, there is no change in the amount of money player 1
has.
Player 1’s behavior function is defined as follows:
BM1 (m) =
{
P if m < M,
NP otherwise;
Similarly, Player 2’s behavior function is defined as follows:
BM2 (m) =
{
P if m > 0,
NP otherwise;
Intuitively, any player produces if and only if he is a seller and the other
player has a positive amount of money. The definition of SM , TM and BM
describes a “monetary behavior” in the sense that in a two people meeting
one person gives goods and receives money, while the other gives money and
receives goods; further, it seems to be the only natural way of describing
such a monetary behavior.
Note that the monetary automaton satisfies many symmetry properties.
First, we have that players use a common state space, initial state, and
transition function: SM1 = S
M
2 , T
M
1 = T
M
2 , and s¯
M
1 = s¯
M
2 . Second, some
states can be associated in a natural way: if we define φ(m) = M −m, we
obtain a bijection φ : SM → SM , satisfying BM1 (m) = BM2 (φ(m)). Third,
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the monetary automaton induces a Markov chain on SM , described by a
symmetric transition matrix. In fact, if ΠM denotes such matrix, one easily
sees that the nonzero entries of ΠM are:
pi0,0 =
1
2
, pi0,1 =
1
2
pim,m−1 =
1
2
, pim,m+1 =
1
2
, for all 0 < m < M
piM,M−1 =
1
2
, piM,M =
1
2
.
Generalizing from the particular case of the monetary automaton, we
say that an automaton I = (I1, I2) is symmetric if: (1) S1 = S2, T1 = T2,
and s¯1 = s¯2; (2) there exist a bijection φ : S → S such that B1(s) =
B2(φ(s)); and (3) I induces a Markov chain on S, described by a symmetric
transition matrix.9 Intuitively, the class of symmetric automata consist of
those that in which different individuals in the same situation determined by
the realization of the uncertainty and with the same state are prescribed the
same action.10
5 Monetary Trading as an Optimal Social In-
stitution
In our model the two players interact in every period of time. This inter-
action is described by an automaton I, which consist of a pair of individual
automata: I = (I1, I2). By changing each player’s automaton, we obtain
different outcomes, some of which may be unreasonable.
The first requirement we impose on the automaton players use is that
it is self-enforcing. More precisely, we will require that each player, given
9Note that any finite automaton I induces a Markov chain defined through by the
following transition matrix Π:
piss′ =
 1 if T (ω, s,Bω(s)) = s
′ for all ω = 1, 2,
0 if T (ω, s,Bω(s)) 6= s′ for all ω = 1, 2,
1
2 otherwise.
10Condition 3 in the definition of a symmetric automaton is far less intuitive. It would
be interesting to dispense with that condition, but unfortunately we have not been able
to do so.
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the other player behavior, have an incentive to act the way as the social
institution prescribes at all possible contingencies. Formally, this amounts
to require that the automaton is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Before giving the formal definition, we need the following notation: given
an automaton I = ((S, s¯), T, B), then (I, s) denotes the automaton ((S, s), T, B);
that is, (I, s) differs from I only on the initial state. We then say that an au-
tomaton I is a subgame perfect equilibrium if for all i = 1, 2, s in S = S1×S2,
and any player i’s automaton I ′i, we have that
Ui(I, s) ≥ Ui((I ′i, I−i), (s′, s−i)).
A second requirement we impose is that there are no obsolete states: all
states should be used regularly in the regular course of the game. As Rubin-
stein pointed out “[these] considerations have some similarity to phenomena
frequently observed in real life: social institutions, various types of organiza-
tions, and human abilities degenerate or are readily discarded if they are not
used regularly.” Formally, we say that a symmetric automaton I is irreducible
if the Markov chain induced by I is irreducible.11
The view that we take here is that, in our framework, only automata that
are finite, symmetric, subgame perfect, and irreducible can describe a social
institution. For N ∈ N, let AN be the set of all symmetric, irreducible, sub-
game perfect automata with a state space having no more than N elements.
Our main result is:
Theorem 1 For N ∈ N, IM , with M = N − 1, solves
max
I∈AN
U1(I) + U2(I).
Theorem 1 asserts that not only the monetary automaton is a symmetric,
irreducible, subgame perfect automaton for any possible amount of money,
but in fact, it is efficient within that class. In particular, any finite, symmet-
ric, irreducible, subgame perfect automaton can be (weakly) dominated by
the monetary trading system of the same level of complexity. In this sense,
monetary trading is an optimal social institution.
11A Markov chain represented by a transition matrix Π is irreducible if for all states s,
and s′ there exists K ∈ N such that pi(K)s,s′ > 0.
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6 On the Proof of Theorem 1
Although we have to deal with some technical detail to prove Theorem 1,
the ideas behind it are simple. In this section we will thus present the main
ideas, and we leave for the appendix a detailed proof.
The first step of the proof is to show that any monetary automaton is
symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect. One easily sees that any mon-
etary automaton is symmetric. Since any state can lead to the two adjacent
states, with the convention that state 0 and stateM each is adjacent of itself,
one can conclude that any monetary automaton is irreducible.
To show that each monetary automaton IM is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium is more delicate. We first study the case in which each player i payoff
function in the repeated game equals
U δi (ω, a) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δkui(ωk, ak),
and then we take the limit of U δi with δ converging to 1; existing results
guarantee that if IM is subgame perfect for all discount factors close to 1,
then IM is subgame perfect in our game.
It is useful to use the discounted version of our game to show that IM
is subgame perfect because in discounted games we can use the one-shot
deviation principle (see Abreu (1988).) For the particular case of a monetary
automaton, we need to show that it is not profitable for a producer to refuse
to produce for a consumer with money, and follow the monetary strategy
afterwards. If a producer deviates by not producing to a consumer with
money, his utility increases today by d, i.e., he gains by not having to produce.
However, he starts next period with one less unit of money, and the other
player starts with one more unit of money. Hence, the difference of payoffs
is
(1− δ)d+ δ [U δi (IM ,m)− U δi (IM ,m+ 1)] =
(1− δ)
[
d+
δ
1− δ
(
U δi (IM ,m)− U δi (IM ,m+ 1)
)]
.
Thus, to show that a deviation is not profitable for all discount factors close
to 1, it is enough to show that
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ
[
U δi (IM ,m+ 1)− U δi (IM ,m)
]
> d,
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that is, the next step is to estimate the value of starting the game with one
extra unit of money.
If a given player i starts with an extra unit of money, it means that the
other player starts with one less unit of money. One can conjecture that
either player i will consume one more time by starting with one extra unit
of money, or she will produce one less time. This conjecture turns out to be
true, and in fact one obtains
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ
[
U δi (IM ,m+ 1)− U δi (IM ,m)
]
= αmu+ (1− αm)d,
where 0 < αm < 1 is the probability that player i will consume one more time
by starting with m + 1 units of money instead of starting with m units of
money. Since by assumption u > d, this result implies that IM is a subgame
perfect equilibrium for all δ close enough to 1.
The second step of the proof is to show that Ui(IM) ≥ Ui(I) for any
i = 1, 2, and any symmetric, irreducible, and subgame perfect automaton I
with |S| ≤ |SM |. Using standard ergodic theorems for Markov chains, one
sees that
Ui(I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s));
hence, in particular,
Ui(IM) =
1
2(M + 1)
−d+ (u− d) + · · ·+ (u− d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1 terms
+ u

=
u− d
2
(
1− 1
M + 1
)
.
Note that in a symmetric automata the number of states in which player
1 produces equals the number of states in which player 2 produces. Since
production is efficient (i.e., since u > d,) the best symmetric outcome is
obtained when production takes place in every state. The above expression
for Ui(IM) says that in the monetary automaton production occurs in all
but one state. More precisely, for every ω there is only one state in which
production does not take place, which is when the consumer does not have
money. Since in every subgame perfect equilibrium there has to be a state in
which a given player does not produces — otherwise the strategy of always
producing would be an equilibrium, which one can easily see not to be the
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case — it follows that each player’s utility of any symmetric, irreducible, and
subgame perfect automaton is at most
u− d
2
(
1− 1|S|
)
.
This concludes the argument, since I is assumed to have at most as much
states as the monetary automaton, and so
1− 1|S| ≤ 1−
1
|SM | = 1−
1
M + 1
.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our main result provides a rationale for the monetary nature of exchange.
We rationalized the monetary nature of exchange by showing that in a class
of economies a monetary system can be understood as a best strategy among
a particular class of strategies.
More precisely, we have shown that there exists a class E0 of economies
(in our case indexed by the parameters u, and d) such that for all possible
money supplies M , and initial money holdings m0 there exist a monetary
system IM,m0 , and a class of automata I0 such that IM,m0 is Pareto optimal
in I0.
The first remark we make is on what is meant by a monetary system. As
we defined it in section 4, the essential features of it is that each player con-
ditions his behavior on money holdings in a way that he produce if and only
if his trading partner has money. Furthermore, the amount of money that
a given player has increases one unit when he produces, and decreases one
unit when he consumes (except possibly when the consumer has no money,
or when the producer has all the money in the economy.)
Implicitly, in our definition of a monetary system, we are assuming that
the price level equals 1 in every period. The stationarity of the price level
does play a role in our optimality result. In fact, it may remind us of standard
results from overlapping generations models, which state that the stationary
monetary equilibrium with constant price level is Pareto optimal provided
that (and because) the total amount of resources is also stationary (see, for
example, Champ and Freeman (1994).) As the following example illustrates,
a similar phenomenon takes place in our economy.
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The following automaton I2M describes a monetary system in which the
price level is 1 in odd periods, and 2 in even periods. We assume that
there are M units of money in the economy, with M being an even natural
number. The transition function, and the behavior function for each player
is analogous to the monetary automaton of section 4 in odd periods, and
differs from this in even period since trade is conducted at an higher price
(a precise description of I2M is given in Appendix B.) We can show that, for
i = 1, 2,
Ui(I
2
M) =
u− d
2
(
1− 3
2(M + 1)
)
<
u− d
2
(
1− 1
M + 1
)
= Ui(IM).
Thus, a non-stationary price level leads to a drop in utility for all players.
This happens because trade is less frequent in those periods in which the
price is high. Also, note that the complexity (i.e., the number of states) of
the monetary automaton with constant prices isM+1, while the complexity
of the automaton I2M is 2(M + 1) — when prices are changing, players need
to keep track of more information. However, a monetary automaton with
constant prices,12 and 2(M + 1) states yields an even higher payoff. Thus,
non-stationary prices are non-optimal because trade is less frequent, and,
more complex.
We emphasize that our main result rationalizes the monetary nature of
trade. When we defined monetary trading, although we have referred to the
states of that particular automaton as money, we did not commit ourselves to
any particular type of money. As we pointed out in the introduction, money
in our model can be made of chocolate, gold, or paper; in fact, it can be
simply memory as in Kocherlakota (1998a) — all these alternatives produce
the same outcome.
An alternative that in our model is equivalent to monetary trading is
private credit, provided that there is a limit to the amount of debt each player
can have. This is, of course, a unpleasant feature of our model. However, in
a model with more than two players, one would be able to distinguish money
12Note that assuming that the price is equal to 1 is without loss of generality: a monetary
system with price equal to 2, total money equal to 5, and initial money holdings of player
1 equal to 3, is equivalent to a monetary system with price equal to 1, total money equal
to 3, and initial money holdings of player 1 equal to 2.
16
from credit: monetary trading involves only one balance per person, while
private credit requires a balance for every pair of players. Furthermore, we
suspect that our main result extent to the multi-player model of Carmona
(2000), which would rationalize monetary exchange in a framework that allow
us to explicitly distinguish money from credit.13
The interpretation that our main result provides a class of economies, and
a class of strategies in which monetary trading is optimal, suggests additional
generalizations: progress in the question of why do we observe monetary
trading can be obtained by similar results in a larger class of economies, and
which consider larger classes of strategies.
A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1. We will start by showing that if for
each player i, his payoff in the repeated game equals
U δi (ω, a) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=1
δkui(ωk, ak),
then the monetary automaton is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The following lemma estimates the benefit for a given player of having
one extra unit of money.
Lemma 1 Let m ∈ {0, ...,M − 1}. Then there is αm ∈ (0, 1) such that
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
i (IM ,m+ 1)− U δi (IM ,m)) = αmu+ (1− αm)d,
for i = 1, 2.
Moreover, for all δ ∈ (0, 1), and i = 1, 2,
1
1− δ (U
δ
i (IM ,m+ 1)− U δi (IM ,m)) ≤ αmu+ (1− αm)d.
Proof. Because player 1’s case is symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only
with the former.
Step 1: Some definitions.
13What prevent us to generalize our main result to the multi-player case is that we lack
an analogue of Lemma 1.
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Denote m(0) = (m + 1,M − m − 1) and m′(0) = (m,M − m). Also,
let Ω := Ω × Ω × ... be the countable infinite Cartesian product of Ω, and
let (Ω,G, µ) denote the usual corresponding probability space. A generic
element of Ω is denoted by ω = {ωt}∞t=1, where ωt ∈ Ω, for all t ∈ N. Given
ω, let m(k)(ω) = (m1(k)(ω),m2(k)(ω)) denote the amount of money players
have at the end of stage k if they started with m(0) and m′(k)(ω) denote
the amount of money players have at the end of stage k if they started with
m′(0).
With this notation, we can write
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) =
1
1− δ
(∫
Ω
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)dµ−
∫
Ω
U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)dµ
)
=
1
1− δ
(∫
Ω
[
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1, )(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)
]
dµ
)
,
where the last equality follows because both the functions ω 7→ U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)
and ω 7→ U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω) are integrable.
Step 2: There exists {At, Bt}∞t=1 such that 11−δ (U δ1 (IM ,m+1)−U δ1 (IM ,m, )) =∞∑
t=1
dδt−1µ(Bt) +
∞∑
t=1
uδt−1µ(At).
Let A1 := {ω ∈ Ω : m1(1)(ω) = 0 and ω1 = 2}; in A1 player 1 is able
to consume under m but not in m′. Note also that m(1) = m′(1). So, for
ω ∈ A1, the difference in payoffs is u. That is, for ω ∈ A1,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)u.
Let B1 := {ω ∈ Ω : m′2(1)(ω) = 0 and ω1 = 1}; in B1 player i has to
produce under m′ but not under m. Note also that m(1) = m′(1). Thus, for
ω ∈ B1,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)d.
We proceed by induction: let t ≥ 2. Let
At := {ω ∈ Ω\((
t−1∪
k=1
Ak) ∪ (
t−1∪
k=1
Bk)) : m1(t)(ω) = 0 and ωt = 2)}
and
Bt = {ω ∈ Ω\((
t−1∪
k=1
Ak) ∪ (
t−1∪
k=1
Bk)) : m
′
2(t)(ω) = 0 and ωt = 1}.
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Similarly as before, we have that for ω ∈ At,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)δt−1u,
and for ω ∈ Bt,
U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω) = (1− δ)δt−1d.
Finally let C = Ω\
[( ∞∪
t=1
At
)
∪
( ∞∪
t=1
Bt
)]
.
For each t ∈ N, At is measurable since it can be written as D1 × ... ×
Dt×Ω×Ω× ... for some D1, ..., Dt ∈ Ω. Similarly, Bt is measurable for each
t ∈ N and so is C. Note also that for all j, k ∈ N, we have that Aj ∩Ak = ∅,
Bj ∩Bk = ∅ and Aj ∩Bk = ∅.
Claim 1 µ(C) = 0.
Proof. Let Sn(ω) be the number of times that ωk = 1 in the first n
periods. If ω ∈ C, then it follows that m1(k)(ω) > 0 whenever ωk = 2, for
all k. Therefore, n − Sn, which equals the number of times that ωt = 2, is
also the amount of money player 1 spent in the first n periods. Since the
amount of money player 1 receives in the first n periods is at most Sn, then
for each n ∈ N, m1(0) + Sn ≥ n − Sn, that is Sn/n ≥ 1/2 − m1(0)/2n.
Hence C ⊆ ∞∩
n=1
{ω ∈ Ω : Sn(ω)
n
≥ 1
2
− m1(0)
2n
} which has measure zero by
lemma 2 applied to the sequence of random variables {Xn}∞n=1, where for all
n, Xn(ω) = χ{ω: ωn=1}.
Hence, we obtain
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) =
1
1− δ (
∞∑
t=1
∫
At
[U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)]dµ+
+
∞∑
t=1
∫
Bt
[U δ1 (IM ,m+ 1)(ω)− U δ1 (IM ,m)(ω)]dµ) =
∞∑
t=1
uδt−1µ(At) +
∞∑
t=1
dδt−1µ(Bt).
Step 3: There exists αm ∈ (0, 1) such that
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) = αmu+ (1− αm)d.
19
By Abel’s theorem (DePree and Swartz (1988), Chapter 11, Theorem 17,
page 135),
lim
δ→1
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) = dµ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) + uµ(
∞∪
t=1
At).
So define αm := µ(
∞∪
t=1
At). Finally note that µ(
∞∪
t=1
At) ≥ (12)m(0) > 0, µ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) ≥
(1
2
)M−m(0), (
∞∪
t=1
At)∩ (
∞∪
t=1
Bt) = ∅ and that Ω = (
∞∪
t=1
At)∪ (
∞∪
t=1
Bt)∪C implying
that µ(
∞∪
t=1
At) + µ(
∞∪
t=1
Bt) = 1.
Step 4: For all δ ∈ (0, 1),
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) ≤ αmu+ (1− αm)d.
Let δ ∈ (0, 1). Then it follows that
1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) =
∞∑
t=1
dδt−1µ(Bt) +
∞∑
t=1
uδt−1µ(At) ≤
∞∑
t=1
dµ(Bt) +
∞∑
t=1
uµ(At) =
αmu+ (1− αm)d.
The following lemma was used above:
Lemma 2 Let {Xn}∞n=1 be a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables with mean equal to ρ ≤ 1
2
and finite variance σ2 > 0
and let c ∈ R. Then µ( ∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)
n
≥ 1
2
− c
n
}) = 0.
Proof. The result will follow from the Law of Iterated Logarithm: Let
{Yk}∞k=1 be independent and identically distributed random variables with
E[Y1] = 0 and σ
2(Y1) = 1. Then lim
n→∞
Sn√
2n log logn
= −1 a.s. (Billingsley
(1995), Theorem 9.5, page 154).
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Define Yn(ω) =
Xn(ω)−ρ
σ
and Syn(ω) =
n∑
k=1
Yk(ω). Then
Syn(ω)
n
= 1
σ
(Sn(ω)
n
−
ρ). By the Law of Iterated Logarithm, there is Z ⊂ Ω with µ(Z) = 0 such
that lim
n→∞
Syn(ω
∞)√
2n log logn
= −1, for all ω ∈ Ω\Z. Let ω ∈ Ω\Z. Then, since
inf
n≥k
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
increases to lim
n→∞
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
, it follows that inf
n≥k
Syn(ω)√
2n log logn
≤ −1,
for all k. That is, S
y
n(ω)√
2n log logn
≤ −1 infinitely often. Thus, for n large enough,
Sn(ω)
n
≤ ρ− σ
√
2 log log n√
n
<
1
2
− c
n
infinitely often (the last inequality follows because for n large enough c <
σ
√
2n log log n → ∞). It follows then that ω /∈ ∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)
n
≥ 1
2
− c
n
};
hence
∞∩
n=1
{ω : Sn(ω)
n
≥ 1
2
− c
n
} ⊆ Z and the result follows.
Lemma 3 There exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), IM is subgame
perfect.
Proof. By Proposition 3.11 of Mertens and Parthasarathy (1987)) (or
Proposition 1 of Abreu (1988)) it is enough to show that no player can
profitably deviate from IM by deviating just in the first stage. Again, because
player 1’s case is symmetric to player 2’s, we deal only with the former.
It is clear that player 1 does not want to deviate from BM1 (M) = NP ,
since by choosing P when he has all the money he would reduce his utility
today by d, and receive the same future utility. So we are left to show that
he does not want to deviate from BM1 (m), for all m = 0, . . . ,M − 1.
Let m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}. If player 1 deviates from BM1 (m), and therefore
chooses NP , his utility will be equal to
U¯ := (1− δ)δU δ1 (IM ,m),
while if he does not deviate, his utility will be equal to
U δ1 (IM ,m) = (1− δ)(−d+ δU δ1 (IM ,m+ 1).
Thus,
U δ1 (IM ,m)− U¯ = (1− δ)
[
−d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1))− U δ1 (IM ,m))
]
.
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By lemma 1,
−d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) →
δ→1
→
δ→1
−d+ αmu+ (1− αm)d > 0.
Therefore, if we let δ∗ be such that for all δ > δ∗
−d+ δ 1
1− δ (U
δ
1 (IM ,m+ 1)− U δ1 (IM ,m)) > 0
for all m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, then
U δ1 (IM ,m)− U¯ > 0
for all m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}.
Lemma 4 Let I ∈ AN . Then,
Ui(I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)).
Proof. Let I ∈ AN , and let S˜ = Ω × S. Then I also induces a Markov
chain Π˜ on S˜ satisfying
p˜ii,j = pii2,j2 .
Since Π is symmetric and irreducible, then so will be Π˜. Hence, by Propo-
sitions 7.1, and 7.5 of Behrends (2000), we have that
lim
n→∞
p˜inrii =
r
|S˜| =
r
2|S| > 0,
where r is the period of Π˜. Thus, all states are positive, i.e., S˜ is a positive
class.
So, by Theorem I.15.2 of Chung (1967), the sequence of functions
ω 7→ 1
n
n∑
k=1
ui(ωk, B(s(ωk)))
converges almost everywhere to
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)),
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and the result follows by the Lebesgue dominated converge theorem.
The following lemma states that in any subgame perfect equilibrium there
has to be a “punishment” state, which is a seller refusing to produce for a
buyer in our model.
Lemma 5 Let I ∈ AN . Then, for all i = 1, 2, there exists s ∈ S such that
Bi(s) = NP.
Proof. Suppose that for some i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Bi(s) = P, for all
s ∈ S. Let I˜−i be such that B−i(s) = NP, for all s ∈ S. Then, we obtain
U−i(Ii, I˜−i) = u/2, while if I−i 6= I˜−i, then
U−i(I) ≤ u
2
− d
2|S| .
Since I is a subgame perfect equilibrium, then I−i = I˜−i, and so Ui(I) =
−d/2.
But, letting I˜i be such that Bi(s) = NP, for all s ∈ S, we obtain
Ui(I˜i, I−i) = Ui(I˜) = 0 ≥ Ui(I). This shows that Ii is not a best response to
I−i, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let N ∈ N be given, and let M = N − 1. We
first establish that IM belongs to AN . It is clear that IM is symmetric, and
since, for all m ∈ SM ,
pi
(M)
mM ≥ pimm+1 · · · piM−1M︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−m terms
piMM · · · piMM︸ ︷︷ ︸
m terms
> 0.
we obtain that for all m,m′ ∈ SM ,
pi
(2M)
mm′ ≥ pi(M)mMpi(M)Mm′ > 0;
that is, the Markov Chain induced by IM is irreducible.
Finally, to show that IM is a subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the
following limit argument: Let s ∈ SM , I ′, and s′ be given. Then, by Lemma
6.1 of Secchi and Sudderth (2000) we obtain that
Ui(IM , s) = lim
δ↑1
U δi (IM , s) ≥ lim
δ↑1
U δi ((I
′
i, I
M
−i), (s
′, s−i)) = Ui((I ′i, I
M
−i), (s
′, s−i)).
Thus, IM is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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We are left to show that U1(IM)+U2(IM) ≥ U1(I)+U2(I) for all I ∈ AN .
For each I ∈ AN , recall that by Lemma 4 we have
Ui(I) =
1
2 |S|
∑
s∈S
∑
ω∈Ω
ui(ω,B(s)).
Let SP = {s ∈ S : B2(s) = P} and SNP = {s ∈ S : B2(s) = NP}. By
symmetry, |SP | = |{s ∈ S : B1(s) = P}| and |SNP | = |{s ∈ S : B1(s) = NP}| .
Then, letting
f(s) =
{
0 if B1(s) = NP,
1 otherwise,
we obtain,
U1(I) =
1
2 |S| [|SP | (u− df(s))− d |SNP | f(s)− d |SP |]
≤ 1
2 |S| [|SP | (u− d)].
Because I is a subgame perfect equilibrium, |SNP | ≥ 1, and so |SP | =
|S| − |SNP | ≤ |S| − 1. Hence, it follows that,
U1(I) ≤ u− d
2
(
1− 1|S|
)
≤ u− d
2
(
1− 1
M + 1
)
= U1(IM).
Since, by symmetry, U2(IM) = U1(IM) ≥ U1(I) = U2(I), the result follows.
B A Monetary Automaton with Oscillating
Prices
In this appendix, we describe formally the monetary system in which the
price level is 1 in odd periods, and 2 in even periods. We assume that
there are M units of money in the economy, with M being an even natural
number. Player 1 starts with m0 of this M units. The state space of I
2
M is
S = {0, . . . ,M} × {e, o}, where e stands for even, and o for odd, and the
initial state is s¯ = (m0, o).
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The transition function is given by is defined by:
T (ω, a, (m,α)) =

(m+ 1, e) if ω = 1, a = P,m ≤M − 1 and α = o,
(m, e) if ω = 1, a = P,m =M and α = o,
(m+ 2, o) if ω = 1, a = P,m ≤M − 2 and α = o,
(m, o) if ω = 1, a = P,m ≥M − 1 and α = o,
(m− 1, e) if ω = 2, a = P,m ≥ 1 and α = o,
(m, e) if ω = 2, a = P,m = 0 and α = o,
(m− 2, o) if ω = 2, a = P,m ≥ 2 and α = o,
(m, o) if ω = 2, a = P,m ≤ 1 and α = o,
(m,−α) otherwise,
where −α = e if α = o, and −α = o if α = e.
Finally, player 1’s behavior function is defined as follows:
B1(m,α) =

P if m < M and α = o,
P if m < M − 1 and α = e,
NP otherwise;
and, similarly, for player 2:
B2(m) =

P if m > 0 and α = o,
P if m > 1 and α = e,
NP otherwise;
This automaton induces two Markov chains Πo, and Πe on {0, . . . ,M},
the former describing the evolution of money holdings in odd periods, and
the latter the same in even periods. One can easily see that both chains are
symmetric and irreducible, and so we obtain (see Lemma 4, and its proof)
that for i = 1, 2,
Ui(I
2
M) =
1
2
(
1
2(M + 1)
M∑
m=0
2∑
ω=1
ui(ω,B(m, o))
+
1
2(M + 1)
M∑
m=0
2∑
ω=1
ui(ω,B(m, e))
)
=
u− d
2
(
1− 3
2(M + 1)
)
.
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